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The concept of service found in Christian theism and related religious per-
spectives offers robust support for a political defense of nonhuman animal 
rights, both in the eschaton and in the present state. By adapting the political 
theory defended by Donaldson and Kymlicka to contemporary theological 
models of the afterlife and of human agency, I  defend a picture of heaven 
as a harmoniously structured society where humans are the functional lead-
ers of a multifaceted, interspecies citizenry. Consequently, orthodox religious 
believers (concerned with promoting God’s will “on Earth as it is in Heaven”) 
have a duty to promote and protect the interests of nonhuman creatures in the 
present, premortem state.
“For the fate of humans and the fate of animals is the same; as one dies, so dies the 
other. They all have the same breath, and humans have no advantage over the ani-
mals; for all is vanity.” (Ecclesiastes 3:19, NRSV)
In August of 2018, a fifty-second video clip was posted on the web-
site for the Southern Baptist Convention’s Ethics and Religious Liberty 
Commission; hours later, after a spate of criticism from online accounts, 
the ERLC took the video down and replaced it with a written apology 
from its vice president.1 In the video, Charles Camosy—a theology pro-
fessor at Fordham University—responded to the question “What is the 
Christian’s responsibility with respect to animals?” by briefly naming 
nonhuman creatures as appropriate targets of concern insofar as they are 
“vulnerable,” “voiceless,” and have interests that are frequently ignored 
by the human culture at large. Critics argued that Camosy’s terminology 
(such as the clarification of “human” versus “nonhuman” animals) irre-
sponsibly blurred the lines between two forms of life that must be kept 
distinct: humans made in the imago Dei and animals made without that 
image. In the apology from the ERLC, VP Daniel Darling reaffirmed the 
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1Although no longer available from the ERLC’s website, an account of the video and 
the ensuing controversy can be found at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
acts-of-faith/wp/2018/08/09/southern-baptists-posted-a-video-opposing-animal-cru-
elty-and-then-profusely-apologized-for-it/?utm_term=.80132f587505. Blogger Grayson 
Gilbert has also linked to a mirrored copy of the original video here: http://www.patheos.
com/blogs/chorusinthechaos/erlc-posts-bizarre-video-on-non-human-animals/.
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group’s commitment to the “unique dignity of human life” grounded in 
humanity’s unique position within the created order.2
This dispute depends on a perceived conflict between two propositions:
CARE: Humans are obligated to care for the interests of nonhuman creatures.
IMAGE: Humans are superior to nonhuman creatures in some sense.
Given that CARE has frequently been defended by denying IMAGE, 
the poor response by some Christians to Camosy’s interview might be 
understandable.3 However, not only did Camosy explicitly endorse both 
CARE and IMAGE in the controversial video (saying “Nonhuman ani-
mals, though obviously not as important as human animals, merit our 
serious attention”), but—as I  will argue—the joint affirmation of both 
propositions fits comfortably within the overall Western theistic tradition 
of humanity’s role within creation. Indeed, rather than being contradic-
tory, one proposition explains the other if the following hypothesis is true:
SERVICE4: Humans are obligated to care for the interests of nonhuman crea-
tures because humans are superior to nonhuman creatures in some sense.
In what follows, I develop and defend the SERVICE thesis by bringing its 
religious underpinnings into conversation with a contemporary trend in 
animal ethics. To be clear: I do not intend to defend speciesism itself. My 
point here is a dialectical one: even on the assumption that speciesism 
is justified, humans nevertheless have strong obligations towards nonhu-
man creatures.
In their 2011 book Zoopolis: A  Political Theory of Animal Rights, Sue 
Donaldson and Will Kymlicka propose what they call an “expanded” 
model of animal rights which adapts a theory of citizenship to argue that 
humans are obligated to care for nonhuman animals precisely because we 
among creatures are best capable of doing so. I contend that the standard 
2The full text of the apology can be located here: https://erlc.com/resource-library/
articles/a-note-about-a-recent-video.
3The term “speciesism,” for example, was coined by Richard Ryder in the early 1970s 
as an expression of the illogical preference of one kind of creature over another (just as rac-
ism or sexism entail a preference of certain subsets of humanity over others); see Ryder, 
“Speciesism Again.” More recently, Berkman has defined speciesism as “the undue (and 
typically exclusive) intrinsic concern for human animals in comparison to all other animals” 
(“From Theological Speciesism to a Theological Ethology,” 14). The opening line of Ryder’s 
initial pamphlet read “Since Darwin, scientists have agreed that there is no ‘magical’ essen-
tial difference between human and other animals, biologically-speaking”—a clear rejection 
of at least some construals of IMAGE.
4With this terminology, I  have in mind Norman Wirzba’s defense of a “servanthood” 
model of environmentalism (over and above the stewardship and citizenship models he 
summarizes); as he describes, servanthood “shifts the orientation of our action away from 
ourselves to the well-being of others, to the work of “making room” for others to be, and 
finally to the praise of the creator. It takes our mind off the current obsession with the con-
sumption of creation and redirects it to the work of enabling the continuity of creation. 
Servanthood, in short, introduces us to the long, patient labor of fitting ourselves within 
God’s creative work” (The Paradise of God, 135–136). See also n. 51.
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eschatological hope of western monotheism should be understood as a 
theological manifestation of Donaldson and Kymlicka’s zoopolis.
I begin with a defense of CARE in Section 1 by summarizing and briefly 
contextualizing Donaldson and Kymlicka’s political theory of animal 
rights before doing the same with the Christian doctrine of the imago Dei 
by defending IMAGE in Section 2. In Section 3, I make a case for SERVICE 
by considering several theological points about human duties to nonhu-
man animals before arguing for the zoopolitical organization of the heav-
enly community in Section 4. I conclude in Section 5.
1. Animal Rights and Dependent Agency
The CARE thesis claims that “Humans are obligated to care for the inter-
ests of nonhuman creatures.” A prominent branch of animal rights theory 
interprets CARE’s use of “obligation” as an ascription of both negative 
rights of non-interference and positive rights of beneficence for animals; 
accordingly, humans should care for both humans and nonhumans in 
roughly similar ways and for roughly similar reasons—because both 
kinds of creatures have lives of value. Perhaps most famously, Tom Regan 
defends the equal rights of moral patients and agents, arguing that a lack 
of “sophisticated abilities” does not entail a lack of moral status, so non-
human creatures with interests are owed many of the same protections—
including duties of care—as humans with interests.5
Some in this tradition have extended theories of animal rights to encom-
pass a political, as well as moral, dimension. Deane Curtin, for example, 
argues that a “politicized ethic of caring for” is both the most rational 
and the most effective approach for promoting the interests of embodied 
creatures.6 Jes Harfield uses the Nordic welfare state to illustrate what the 
demands of distributive justice might entail for all rights-bearers, regard-
less of their species.7 Cheryl Abbate argues that even explicitly speciesist 
political frameworks (such as many grounded on a common interpretation 
of Aristotle) can nonetheless be adapted to incorporate the abilities of non-
human animals to recognize and participate in communities of justice.8
The political approach of Donaldson and Kymlicka to animal ethics 
focuses on expanding the relational rights humans enjoy with each other 
to include nonhuman creatures by grounding interpersonal obligations not 
in biology (as speciesists might expect), but in public relationships; as they 
explain, “We are not just members of species. We are members of societies, 
and the two don’t necessarily overlap.”9 Differentiating between inalien-
able rights possessed by all creatures (such as the right to live) and those 
rights afforded only to members of particular communities (like the right 
5Regan, The Case for Animal Rights, 279–280.
6Curtin, “Toward an Ecological Ethic of Care,” 68.
7Harfield, “Rights, Solidarity, and the Animal Welfare State,” 166.
8Abbate, “‘Higher’ and ‘Lower’ Political Animals,” 55.
9Donaldson and Kymlicka, Zoopolis, 99.
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to vote), Donaldson and Kymlicka craft a simple taxonomy of interspecies 
political structures wherein domesticated creatures are owed the rights of 
citizens, wild animals deserve unhindered sovereignty, and liminal crea-
tures are treated as autonomous denizens of interspecies environments.
This does require a reconceptualization of citizenship, but not in 
its entirety. To be a citizen is to be an active and engaged member of a 
community in at least some sense, both contributing to and enjoying the 
products of the public work; traditionally, citizens have been expected to 
shape and offer their contributions as a function of their cognitive abili-
ties (speaking, debating, voting, etc.), but on that reading, Donaldson and 
Kymlicka (and the disability rights movement as a whole) point out that 
“children, the mentally disabled, people with dementia, and those who 
are temporarily incompetent due to illness or injury” would be ruled out 
from being recognized as political agents.10 Instead, as Martha Nussbaum 
argues, “people with cognitive disabilities are equal citizens, and law 
ought to show respect for them as full equals”;11 to this end, the disability 
human rights paradigm developed by Michael Stein defends “individ-
ual talent-development” as the goal of citizenship, requiring societies to 
acknowledge the inherent value of all persons, rather than basing value 
on an individual’s measurable ability to functionally contribute to society 
in particular ways.12 Accordingly the Zoopolis framework assesses ability 
from the bottom up, embracing all individual creatures while accounting 
for their functional variations.
For Donaldson and Kymlicka, acknowledging the value of some citi-
zens (including nonhuman ones) takes the form of a trust-based depend-
ent agency wherein even the most severely disabled person possesses 
full-fledged political autonomy, “but it is agency that is exercised in and 
through relations with particular others in whom they trust, and who 
have the skills and knowledge needed to recognize and assist the expres-
sion of agency.”13 This form of agency is similarly focused on the unique 
situations of individuals, but it is importantly not identical to wardship: 
wards properly benefit from society without contributing to it—citizens 
are “active co-authors of the community’s laws and institutions.”14
It is not clear that domesticated animals lack the ability to be depend-
ent agents within human communities; indeed, many of their capacities 
for community-building are precisely the features that encouraged their 
domestication in the first place. Behavioral preadaptations and biological 
commonalities of domesticates demonstrate that a package of shared qual-
ities amongst creatures like horses, dogs, cows, and more primed them 
to be absorbed into human communities; this comports well with Brett 
10Donaldson and Kymlicka, Zoopolis, 104.
11Nussbaum, “The Capabilities of People with Cognitive Disabilities,” 350.
12Stein, “Disability Human Rights,” 77.
13Donaldson and Kymlicka, Zoopolis, 104.
14Donaldson and Kymlicka, Zoopolis, 102.
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Walker’s description of domesticated animals as “allied organisms” who 
historically threw their lot in with humanity in order to flourish alongside 
us hairless bipeds.15 Consequently, if domesticated animals can communi-
cate in some way with humans and can contribute to the common good, 
then they, too, can qualify as citizens under the dependent agency model.16
These two conditionals are easily demonstrated: not only can humans 
communicate basic concepts to domesticated animals (as to dogs, pigs, or 
horses who commonly respond to commands), but we can also receive 
information from animals based on “a vast repertoire of vocalizations, 
gestures, movements, and signals.”17 The late Donald Griffin catalogued 
numerous examples of communicative behavior in animals ranging from 
audible noise to physical movements that, in some cases, even exhibit mul-
ti-layered meanings in the form of deception or manipulation.18 Learning 
to be attentive to such signals (and to translate them into language that the 
unattentive can understand) is not only the role of the dependent agent’s 
advocate, but is familiar to any pet owner or animal trainer.
Furthermore, Zoopolis contends that animals make their contributions 
to the public good most readily through their “sheer presence” in society 
that “alters our conception of the political community and the institutions 
and structures of communal life.”19 In this way, animals do not need to 
cognitively contribute to political discussion at all, but can function as 
full participants in the political process nonetheless insofar as they direct 
attention to areas of social need, model ideal relational behaviors, and 
more simply by pursuing their own desired ends. For example, Donaldson 
and Kymlicka relate a story of dog owners reshaping a park from a rough 
area known for illegal activity into a popular space for families simply by 
persistently walking with their dogs regularly around the public space; it 
may be the case that humans are the “enablers,” but the dogs are a neces-
sary element of this improvement and “the fact that the dogs cannot reflect 
about the goals of the activism, or their role in it, doesn’t change the fact 
that they are participants in the process.”20 Participants who, it should be 
noted, were simply doing what they wanted to do anyway: play in a park.
In short, dependent agency shares many important features with the 
broad sense of autonomy described in Chimpanzee Rights: A Philosopher’s 
Brief as an example of moral standing possessed by creatures who are “the 
source of their own actions, and [who] act on behalf of themselves rather 
than because of some external force or internal compulsion.”21 The brief 
15Walker, “Animals and the Intimacy of History,” 59. See also Zeder, “The Domestication 
of Animals.”
16For more on the constitutive features of community membership for nonhuman ani-
mals, see Section 4.
17Donaldson and Kymlicka, Zoopolis, 109.
18Griffin, Animal Minds, 195–210.
19Donaldson and Kymlicka, Zoopolis, 113.
20Donaldson and Kymlicka, Zoopolis, 115.
21Andrews et al., Chimpanzee Rights, 82.
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points out that many animals, from chimps to harvester ants, can “form 
preferences, set goals, and act so as to satisfy wants”—allowing them to 
do so within the context of a community to which they also contribute is 
the essence of citizenship theory.
Donaldson and Kymlicka admit that wild animals and liminal crea-
tures (who exist on the border of the domestic/wild distinction) do not 
contribute in the same way to human communities and, therefore, cannot 
qualify as citizens of typical human societies. In the case of the former, 
they contend that wild animals should be treated as sovereign agents who 
have the right to govern themselves apart from the zoopolis without being 
invaded, colonized, or robbed. However, whereas some wild animal rights 
theorists defend a strong duty of non-interference that precludes even 
humanitarian interventions or a contextual model whereby intervention 
is merely permitted, but not required, Donaldson and Kymlicka defend 
a “duty of assistance” whereby humans and other members of a zoopolis 
could be obligated to help sovereign animals at risk from various exter-
nal threats, such as natural disasters.22 Following Goodin, Pateman, and 
Pateman, Zoopolis suggests that including human advocates mandated to 
defend the interests of wild animals in geopolitical conversations might be 
one way to operationalize such a political mechanism, but it leaves open 
that various zoopoleis might carry out their responsibilities to non-do-
mesticated animals in different ways.23
Similarly, creatures in the liminal space between domestication and the 
wild, such as raccoons, mice, and many insects, are not tamed, but still 
rely on humans for elements of their livelihood; Zoopolis suggests that 
such animals be treated as non-citizen denizens who are afforded certain 
protections by the citizenry, just as in the case of human migrants (like 
short-term tourists or long-term residents) and inhabitants who “opt-out” 
of citizenship (such as the Amish) are treated within exclusively human 
communities.24 Such individuals cannot simply be exterminated (or even 
expelled or relocated) without careful consideration of their rights, but 
such obligations are less complex than those shared by co-equal citizens 
of the zoopolis (regardless of their species) given that the relationship 
between denizens and citizens is more contingent.
Taken as a whole, this political theory of animal rights can easily affirm 
both CARE and IMAGE: in the first case, humans are obligated to care for 
the interests of animals in the strongest sense by treating them as posi-
tive-rights holders who are full members of the political community, albeit 
in a modulated manner relative to their social function. In the second case, 
human superiority is a matter of general cognitive function that allows 
22Donaldson and Kymlicka, Zoopolis, 205–206. For a defense of strict non-intervention-
ism, see Panagiotarakou, “Right to Place”; for a model that treats aid to wild animals as 
supererogatory, see Palmer, “The Laissez-Faire View.”
23See also Goodin, Pateman, and Pateman, “Simian Sovereignty.”
24Donaldson and Kymlicka, Zoopolis, 250–251.
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for the most pragmatic accomplishment of CARE, but this does not entail 
a value claim about the human species beyond a certain functional real-
ity, embodied as a care-giving responsibility. Importantly, Donaldson and 
Kymlicka ground the citizen-relations of the zoopolis on a theory of sub-
jectivity which defines personhood as “not a capacity we can either ‘dis-
cover’ or ‘fail to find’ in another, but rather, a way of ‘being in relation’ 
with others.”25 Adapting this point from Barbara Smuts, their notion of 
personhood is an active process in which we engage, not a property we 
possess; if we have the opportunity to engage in the process with another 
creature capable of experiencing a relationship and neglect to do so, then 
we are the ones whose personhood degrades.26
As discussed in the next section, the vision of Zoopolis meshes well with 
the theological presentation of animals and humans as contingent beings 
both pronounced to be “good” by God upon their creation, but socially 
ordered such that humans are called to a unique leadership role within the 
created community. Furthermore, if animals are present in heaven, and if 
we can enter into relationships with animals, then doing so in heaven is 
also a reasonable expectation.
2. The Imago Dei and Animal Immortality
The IMAGE thesis claims that “Humans are superior to nonhuman crea-
tures in some sense.” Admittedly, it is possible to read this proposition 
as an explicitly speciesist proclamation and Christian tradition has often 
done so, opposing animal rights for centuries.27 However, IMAGE’s final 
clause demands clarification. Often, theologically-motivated denials of 
animal rights (and, indeed, many Christian defenses of speciesism) are 
based on a particular interpretation of the biblical conception of “God’s 
Image”; in this section, I briefly outline two general models of the imago 
Dei and consider the implications of each for both the IMAGE thesis and 
the postmortem plight of nonhuman creatures.
25Donaldson and Kymlicka, Zoopolis, 122.
26Donaldson and Kymlicka quote Smuts at length: “In other words, when a human being 
relates to an individual nonhuman being as an anonymous object, rather than as a being with 
its own subjectivity, it is the human, and not the other animal, who relinquishes personhood” 
(Zoopolis, 112). This also helpfully delimits the scope of potential personhood degradation, 
restricting it only to conditional contingent relationships that are actualized; despite the fact 
that I have the opportunity to relate to many other people, my personhood does not thereby 
degrade simply if I choose not to pursue such relationships. Instead, it is only in cases where 
I in fact interact with others, but do so in ways that fail to treat them honorably that my per-
sonhood degrades in the fashion so described. My thanks to Blake Hereth for pushing me to 
clarify this point.
27For example, in Chapter 17 of On the Morals of the Manicheans, Augustine argues that 
if animals had rights, then Jesus would not have killed the herd of pigs in his exorcism of 
the Gadarene demoniac. Aquinas later argues in the Summa Contra Gentiles that “animals 
are ordered to man’s use in the natural course of things, according to divine providence. 
Consequently, man uses them without any injustice, either by killing them or by employing 
them in any other way” (III/2/Ch112/Sec.12–13).
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Drawing from various scriptural sources, Christian anthropology fre-
quently refers to the imago Dei as a unique element of human nature, but 
traditions disagree on the nature of this Image. One dominant view iden-
tifies the imago Dei as humanity’s capacity for rational thought, thereby 
treating the Image as an ontological component of a human being: call 
this position the RATIONALITY model.28 A  separate tradition treats 
the imago Dei as a duty or calling uniquely expected of humans within 
God’s ordered universe as a consequence of their functional capacities: 
call this teleological view the RESPONSIBILITY model.29 Both views 
recognize that humanity’s obligations follow from humanity’s capabili-
ties, but RESPONSIBILITY treats the imago Dei as a feature of the former, 
while RATIONALITY identifies it as (or as a crucial component of) the 
latter. So, both models offer, in different ways, a defense of IMAGE: on 
RATIONALITY, humans qua humans are essentially ontologically supe-
rior to nonhuman creatures, while RESPONSIBILITY treats humans qua 
humans as functionally superior at performing certain tasks necessary for 
accomplishing God’s Creation-ordering goals, chief among them standing 
in loving relationships with other individuals.30
As demonstrated in Section 1, recognizing a pragmatic difference in 
social ordering based on functional capacities is not necessarily speciesist, 
so the political consequences of RESPONSIBILITY are not immediately 
ethically loaded. This cannot be said of RATIONALITY, given its clearly 
speciesist position. Historically, defenders of RATIONALITY have linked 
their ontological understanding of the imago Dei to their denial of animal 
rights tout court, thereby arguing that speciesism is not ethically problem-
atic because animals do not possess infringeable rights (or, indeed, any 
rights).31 In contrast, defenders of RESPONSIBILITY might deny rights 
to nonhuman animals for other reasons, but speciesism is not logically 
28Historical defenders of such a position include Irenaeus, Gregory of Nyssa, Gregory 
Palamas, Maximos the Confessor, Aquinas, Descartes, and Leibniz. For contemporary 
defenders, see Farris, “An Immaterial Substance View”; Vainio, “Imago Dei and Rationality”; 
and Visala, “Imago Dei, Dualism, and Evolution.”
29Members of this tradition include Barth and Brunner, with Bolos, “A Functionalist 
Account of Human Uniqueness”; Churchouse, “Distinguishing the Imago Dei from the Soul”; 
Crisp, “A Christological Model of the Imago Dei”; Green, “Why the Imago Dei Should Not Be 
Identified with the Soul”; and Fergusson, “Humans Created According to the Imago Dei” 
extending the characterization into contemporary contexts.
30Certainly, this bipartite distinction is oversimplified: in addition to structural and func-
tional pictures, many theologians and philosophers of religion offer a third, relational, model 
for the imago Dei (De Cruz and De Maeseneer, “The Imago Dei”; Erickson, Christian Theology), 
while Petrusek discusses no fewer than ten distinct heuristics for the doctrine in “The Image 
of God and Moral Action.” In general, the nuances of these taxonomies are important, but 
tangential to the argument here, which needs to distinguish simply between an ontological 
and a non-ontological model of God’s image in/for humanity.
31McLaughlin briefly traces a history of the sharp human/animal dichotomy in Christian 
tradition, referencing Augustine and Aquinas, as well as Kant, Descartes, Gregory of Nyssa, 
Irenaeus, and the writer of Genesis; see “Noblesse Oblige,” 133–134. For more, see Linzey, 
Why Animal Suffering Matters, 28–29.
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entailed by the view and those in this camp often argue for the potential 
ethical standing of nonhuman creatures in many ways.32
Clearly, the contrast between RATIONALITY and RESPONSIBILITY is 
vibrant and I don’t mean to suggest that this debate about the imago Dei 
is without nuance; this brief overview is intended primarily to disambig-
uate how I will proceed with regards to the IMAGE thesis. However, one 
additional conclusion is noteworthy: many defenders of RATIONALITY, 
because of additional commitments they hold, must conclude that only 
human beings can go to heaven. If one adopts the RATIONALITY model 
of the imago Dei and, furthermore, identifies those same cognitive capac-
ities as components of the soul (a separate contentious position), then it 
might follow inescapably that animals have neither the Image of God nor 
souls or spiritual natures and, therefore have no eschatological destiny 
(if possessing or being constituted by a soul is required to experience 
heaven).33 Against this, philosophers and theologians have marshalled a 
bevy of arguments in defense of animal immortalism (and, indeed, uni-
versalism), many of which are grounded upon “the natural outflow of 
divine love and justice” towards all creatures whom God loves.34
Regardless, many Christian traditions affirm the presence of at least 
some animals in heaven and the Bible resounds with images of animals 
worshipping God alongside human beings, not only in the present state, 
but also in the future, where wolves, leopards, and lions will live in peace 
not only with lambs, goats, and calves, but with humans as well (Isaiah 
11:6–9) as “every creature in heaven and on earth and under the earth and 
in the sea, and all that is in them” proclaim God’s glory (Revelation 5:13).35 
Defenders of RATIONALITY could argue that these token creatures never 
lived in a pre-mortem state; RESPONSIBILITY does not require a spe-
cific position here and, indeed, can recognize the potential continuity of 
individual creatures from Earth to heaven without much difficulty. But, 
whether these heavenly animals are numerically identical with particular 
animals who walked on Earth is an important, but distinct question to 
this one: if animals and humans co-exist peacefully in the eschaton, what 
32Clough, for example, characterizes the imago Dei christologically as a species-wide 
vessel of God’s incarnation, rather than a ground of value for an individual image-bearer 
(On Animals, 100–102); see also, Crisp, “A Christological Model of the Imago Dei.” Horan, 
“Deconstructing Anthropocentric Privilege,” goes even further to include nonhuman crea-
tures as bearers of God’s image, a provocative thesis that reflects the zootheistic interests 
explained in Hereth, “Animal Gods.”
33For a discussion (and critique) of such a position, see Horan, “Deconstructing 
Anthropocentric Privilege.”
34Graves, Hereth, and John, “In Defense of Animal Universalism,” 162. See also Crummett, 
“Eschatology for Creeping Things (and Other Animals)”; Hereth, “Two Arguments for 
Animal Immortality”; and Murray, Nature Red in Tooth and Claw, 122–129. On the possibility 
that nonhuman animals might be importantly morally distinct from humans in a manner 
than might bear on their eschatological destinies, see Abbate, “Nonhuman Animals.”
35For an insightful argument concerning the extent of this, see Pawl, “Exploring 
Theological Zoology.”
484 Faith and Philosophy
is the nature of that community?36 Much like Donaldson and Kymlicka’s 
ultimate hope, the eschatological image of the New Heavens and New 
Earth envisions a structured society with human beings functioning in 
leadership roles, but exercising that leadership not as the dominators of 
a morally neutral creation, but as enriched caretakers of a multifaceted, 
interspecies citizenry. Although such an outcome is explicable as contin-
gent happenstance on the RATIONALITY thesis, the RESPONSIBILITY 
model of the imago Dei has far greater explanatory power for the biblical 
imagery of a zoopolitical afterlife.37
3. Theological Animal Rights and Dominion Constraints
Before considering zoopolitical eschatology, a defense of SERVICE is war-
ranted. This thesis states that “Humans are obligated to care for the interests 
of nonhuman creatures because humans are superior to nonhuman creatures 
in some sense.” In this section, I motivate the SERVICE thesis by way of a 
joint defense of CARE and IMAGE, linked with a basing relation grounded 
in philosophical reflections upon Christian scripture and tradition.
Many writers have pointed out how the biblical notion of “dominion” 
has shaped the arc of human-animal relations in Western culture.38 Rooted 
in the latter part of Genesis 1, the teaching comes from the command God 
gives to humanity immediately following its creation:
So God created humankind in his image, in the image of God he created 
them; male and female he created them. God blessed them, and God said 
to them, “Be fruitful and multiply, and fill the earth and subdue it; and have 
dominion over the fish of the sea and over the birds of the air and over every 
living thing that moves upon the earth (Genesis 1:27–28, emphasis added).
This passage could be construed as a strong support of IMAGE—if humans 
alone bear the Image39—and a strong denial of CARE—since humans are 
called to “subdue” everything nonhuman. John Locke famously interpreted 
36For more on the numerical identity of nonhuman creatures in the postmortem state with 
creatures from the premortem state, see chapter nine of Dougherty, The Problem of Animal 
Pain.
37C.S. Lewis—who defended a variation of RATIONALITY and argued for the postmor-
tem cognitive enhancement of nonhuman animals—argued that animals might themselves 
enter heaven on the basis of their premortem relationships with humans; “The theory I am 
suggesting .  .  . makes God the centre of the universe and man the subordinate centre of 
terrestrial nature: the beasts are not co-ordinate with man, but subordinate to him, and their 
destiny is through and through related to his. And the derivative immortality suggested for 
them is not a mere amende or compensation: It is part and parcel of the new heaven and new 
earth, organically related to the whole suffering process of the world’s fall and redemption”; 
see The Problem of Pain, 145.
38For example, Peter Singer treats the beginning of Genesis—and, specifically, the domin-
ion mandate—as a key impetus for the birth and spread of the speciesist oppression of non-
human animals across the centuries; see Animal Liberation, 226.
39To be fair, the passage specifically claims only that humans bear the Image, not that 
humans alone bear the Image; for more on this, see Hereth, “Animal Gods” and Horan, 
“Deconstructing Anthropocentric Privilege.”
485IS HEAVEN A ZOOPOLIS?
this verse in precisely this manner, explaining in the Second Treatise how 
“God, who hath given the World to Men in common, hath also given them 
reason to make use of it to the best advantage of Life, and convenience,” 
ultimately concluding that “all inferior Creatures be common [property] 
to all Men.”40 However, against this, it could well be the case that a strong 
defense of IMAGE entails a strong support of CARE, in addition to certain 
normative constraints on the human exercise of that dominion.
Dominion must be understood in connection with a view of God’s 
ultimate sovereignty in the manner described by David Clough as a 
“theocentric position” towards Creation, grounded on the maxim that 
“God creates for God’s own glory.”41 As a part of God’s grand picture, 
humans—like all animals—have a particular role to play, but this does 
not entail that humans alone have a role to play; indeed, as Clough says, 
“not only creation, but every creature has a part in God’s creative and 
salvific purposes.”42 Dominion, then, must be understood as a uniquely 
human contribution to a much more complicated—and ultimately God-
focused—project; as, in John Jones’s words, “of giving thanks for, tending, 
and nurturing what is first and always God’s.”43 Contra Locke, creation—
including the animals—is not simply our property with which we can do 
as we will, but rather, in our dominion, we are duty-bound to care for and 
respect what ultimately and always belongs to its Creator. In the words of 
Stassen and Gushee, “the ‘dominion’ given to humans in Genesis 1:26–29 
does imply a human preeminence, a theme echoed in such passages as 
Psalm 8, but it opposes a theology of domination.”44 Although innumera-
ble examples of historical dominion-language exist where the authority of 
God has been twisted towards attempted justifications for moral horrors, 
this is a tacit abdication of the theocentric teleology of Creation. Instead, 
considered properly:
The term dominion carries no insult to our fellow creatures. We were all sent 
forth into the world with different gifts and attributes. Their gifts, the one 
their Creator intended for them, are good for many things—governing just 
isn’t one of them. Someone has to assume dominion, and looking around 
the earth we seem to be the best candidates, exactly because we humans are 
infinitely superior in reason and alone capable of knowing justice under a 
dominion still greater than our own.45
40Locke, Two Treatises on Government, 286–287 (§26 and 27). For a contrary reading of 
Locke’s view, see Squadrito, “Locke’s View of Dominion.”
41Clough, On Animals, 20. In fact, the entirety of Clough’s first chapter traces the theolog-
ical (as well as creedal) history of this fundamental claim in light of its frequently anthropo-
centric misinterpretation. For a congruent perspective, see Linzey, “The Place of Animals in 
Creation.”
42Clough, On Animals, 23.
43Jones, “Humans and Animals,” 269.
44Stassen and Gushee, Kingdom Ethics, 441.
45Scully, Dominion, 12.
486 Faith and Philosophy
Humanity’s place at the pinnacle of Creation is not a license to brutally 
subjugate everything beneath us; it is a charge to shepherd and care for 
everything under our God-given responsibility.
Furthermore, Jones continues on to point out that placing such con-
straints on one’s understanding of the dominion mandate, “ought yield to 
a more fundamental noninstrumental dominion of care, love, reason, and 
thought” for that which we are charged to protect.46 By following our duty 
to care for the creatures under our watch, we should come to care for them 
in themselves since the whole of Creation is inherently valuable. The Bible 
does not simply give humanity an arbitrary command from God to care 
for the world, but offers an explanation as well: God declared the whole of 
Creation—not simply humanity—good (Genesis 1:25, 31) and delights in 
it (Psalms 104:31). As Pope Francis’s encyclical Laudato Si explains, “Every 
creature is thus the object of the Father’s tenderness, who gives it its place 
in the world. Even the fleeting life of the least of beings is the object of 
his love, and in its few seconds of existence, God enfolds it with his affec-
tion.”47 Given that humanity bears God’s image, and that nonhuman ani-
mals are consistently declared an inextricable part of Creation, it seems a 
sensible conclusion that we will more fully experience life as God intended 
it when we love animals to the best of our abilities, just as God does.
This understanding of dominion as being grounded in love comes into 
even sharper focus when we consider the role of Christ who has “first 
place in everything” (Colossians 1:18). Despite the fact that Christians 
are under the dominion of Jesus, we are not ourselves without value and 
worth. As Jones asks, “Are we who are dominated by Christ mere means 
to his ends? In his dominion of service and love, does he not rather make 
himself a means to our ends? He dies after all, for the sake of our salva-
tion.”48 This is, as Andrew Linzey has described it, the expression of divine 
power as “katabasis, humility, self-sacrifice, powerlessness” exemplified 
best by the crucified God.49 Put differently, if humanity’s possession of 
the imago Dei makes IMAGE true, then, as Clough describes, “this makes 
the image of God a moral responsibility, rather than an indicator of moral 
status”—that is to say, it makes IMAGE entail the sort of responsibilities 
expected by CARE.50
46Jones, “Humans and Animals,” 269.
47In the same section, Francis also cites the apocryphal Wisdom of Solomon, which prayer-
fully describes the love of God, saying “For you love all things that exist, and detest none 
of the things that you have made, for you would not have made anything if you had hated 
it” (11:24).
48Jones, “Humans and Animals,” 269.
49Linzey, Animal Gospel, 39.
50Clough, “The Problem with Human Equality,” 86. Elsewhere, Clough similarly argues 
that prioritizing an ontological separation between humans and nonhuman animals (instead 
of a particular function for humans within the created order) is akin to a pre-Darwinian read-
ing of Genesis 1: as he explains, “the attribution of a particular vocation for human beings is 
insufficient to ground the qualitative distinction that the human-separatist position requires. 
Our task and responsibility before God is no doubt particular to the place we find ourselves 
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If Christians are to truly participate in Creation as God intended, then 
they must stay properly focused on the servant-mindedness of the domin-
ion mandate as exemplified in Christ’s service to humanity.51 Although 
many possibilities exist for how faithful people might conceptualize “the 
good life,” if we take a cue from God’s original benedictions over a prelap-
sarian universe (as well as the glimmers of humanity’s position in the 
eschaton), we can see that Creation is not something to be twisted to what-
ever ends we desire, but has an inherent worth connected to its Creator’s 
ultimate plan, whatever that may be; true dominion involves recognizing, 
appreciating, facilitating, and encouraging the realization of this reality, 
not simply substituting selfish, speciesist ends in its place.
Moreover, the Bible presents numerous pictures of humans obliged 
to treat animals as intrinsically valuable creatures—and perhaps even 
rights-bearers of some sort—such as in Levitical laws that promote ani-
mal-directed freedom (Exodus 23:11 and Leviticus 25:7), rest (Exodus 
20:10), and compensation for labor (Deuteronomy 22:4, 25:4), as well as 
stories of God’s love for nonhuman animals, such as that of Jonah, wherein 
God is hesitant to destroy Nineveh given that it is filled both with people 
“and also much cattle” (Jonah 4:11; see also Numbers 22, Matthew 10:29–
31, et al.). Clough comprehensively summarizes the biblical data involv-
ing analogies between human and nonhuman animals, demonstrating the 
co-dependency of scriptural interspecies cultural relationships, indicating 
the irrelevance of species boundaries for divine instruction, praise, and 
judgment, and displaying the frequency with which Jesus, in particular, 
recognized the commonality amongst all creatures; each of these lines 
of argument demonstrate “good theological reasons for recognizing the 
ways in which humans and other animals stand in the same place before 
God.”52 Indeed, this sort of biblical material lies behind John Berkman’s 
condemnation of “theological speciesism” which he describes as “a failure 
to see the variety of nonhuman animals the way God sees them; that is, 
failing to see them as creatures of God who manifest God’s goodness and 
give praise to God in their flourishing as creatures of diverse natures.”53 
Importantly, in contrast to simple speciesism, a rejection of theological 
speciesism does not entail a rejection of IMAGE.54
within God’s creation, but the Bible repeatedly affirms that all creation participates in the 
praise of God and each living thing has a part in God’s purposes.” For more, see Clough, 
“All God’s Creatures,” 153.
51As Linzey says, “if humans are to claim lordship over creation, then it can only be a 
lordship of service. There can be no lordship without service” (Animal Gospel, 39).
52Clough, On Animals, 31–44.
53Berkman, “From Theological Speciesism to a Theological Ethology,” 14.
54Clough makes the interesting observation that “In striking contrast to Peter Singer’s 
slogan that ‘all animals are equal,’ it is notable that New Testament teaching on God’s care 
of sparrows and obligations to pull sheep out of wells uses the animal examples to show 
how much more God must care for humans,” suggesting once again that the recognition 
of theological animal rights does not require rejecting IMAGE; see “Consuming Animal 
Creatures,” 40.
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And though it is true that animal sacrifice is a central element of the bibli-
cal story, God’s love for those sacrificial animals serves both to underline the 
significance of their deaths (beyond functioning simply as a ritualistic tool) 
and to further symbolize the culmination of those sacrifices in the horror 
and the beauty of the Cross. Kimberley Patton has persuasively argued on 
hermeneutical grounds that, given religious themes commonly interwoven 
with sacrificial practices (such as perfection, beautification, cooperation, and 
consecration), “far from objectifying animal victims, ‘the logic of sacrifice,’ on 
the terms of its own self-presentation, hallows and empowers them.”55 In a sim-
ilar way, Clough’s hamartiological analysis of nonhuman creatures in light 
of Christ’s incarnation as a human animal concludes that “For Israel, there-
fore, nonhuman animals were sacrificed for the sake of humans; in Christ, 
a human animal was sacrificed not for humans but for the sake of all crea-
tures.”56 For all of its problematic ethical implications, the ritual system of 
animal slaughter in the Bible, emically speaking, might well operate with a 
surprisingly honorific perspective towards those creatures being sacrificed.57
Therefore, the religious call for humans to exert themselves as servants 
of God’s creation entails not simply avoiding certain harms, but positively 
caring for all creatures loved by God; not only is this the essence of the 
SERVICE hypothesis, but it aligns well with the Zoopolis model.
4. Is Heaven a Zoopolis?
The preceding characterization of the Zoopolis political model, in conjunc-
tion with the presented defense of the SERVICE thesis, provides good rea-
sons to affirm a zoopolitical eschatological community, insofar as SERVICE 
can also be thought to hold even in the afterlife. In this section, I respond 
to potential criticisms of this eschatological application to demonstrate the 
following theses:
(1) SERVICE applies in the eschaton,
(2) The Zoopolis model explains how (1) could operate.
Furthermore, in Section 5, I will offer a rough exegetical gloss to contex-
tualize this view within popularly-accepted theological perspectives that 
take the imagery of Christian scripture to describe heaven as a zoopolis.
(1) SERVICE Applies in the Eschaton
55Patton, “Animal Sacrifice,” 402 (emphasis in original). This line of thinking fits well with 
Linzey’s point that “Christian sacrifice . . . involves the sacrifice of the higher for the lower 
and not the reverse”; see Linzey, Christianity and the Rights of Animals, 43 (cf. 40–46).
56Clough, On Animals, 129, Jonathan Klawans similarly discusses the connection of ritual-
istic slaughter with the penitent believer’s desire to emulate God, arguing ultimately that the 
biblical model of animal sacrifice honorably recapitulates the relationship between God and 
humanity: “as God is to Israel, so is Israel to their domesticated animals” (Purity, Sacrifice, and 
the Temple, 72). On Klawans’s analysis, this also means that the “spiritualization” of sacrifice 
in the New Testament—such as in the form of the Eucharistic meal—likewise promotes the 
same kind of ritualistic purity (221–222).
57For a contrary position, see Kasperbauer, Subhuman, 35–38.
489IS HEAVEN A ZOOPOLIS?
Both theological and philosophical motivations could undergird a denial 
of (1). For example, on the view that God’s presence in heaven provides 
for the needs of all creatures therein, SERVICE might well be rendered 
unnecessary in the afterlife: what need would there be for humans to care 
for the interests of nonhuman creatures if those interests are already pro-
tected by God? Such theology questions humanity’s eschatological pur-
pose as caretakers without necessarily staking out a position on theological 
anthropology or doctrines like the imago Dei. However, it is important to 
note that the story of the dominion mandate indicates its conferral within 
the Edenic paradise, a context of perfect creaturely provision akin to the 
heavenly state; if the dominion mandate applied in the initial, prelapsar-
ian case, then there is no immediate theological reason to deny its applica-
bility in the postmortem case simply by dint of God’s sustaining presence.
Philosophically, (1) could be denied on the grounds that heaven’s 
perfect goodness entails the complete freedom of nonhuman animals 
from the influence of human agents, perhaps even excluding the possi-
bility that nonhuman creatures could depend on humans in an infinitely 
good afterlife.58 This objection fails for at least two reasons: firstly, inter-
action between humans and nonhumans is not necessarily problematic 
(so a perfect state would not necessarily dispense with such encounters) 
and, secondly, the key form of interspecies interaction prescribed by the 
Zoopolis model—agent-dependency—is not necessarily harmful, nor is it 
precluded, in principle, from heaven.
Regarding the first point, although it is clearly not difficult to produce 
examples of cross-species interactions involving humans that do harm 
both to domesticated and to non-domesticated nonhuman creatures, this 
is not a necessary feature of such relationships—particularly when such 
interactions are bounded within the constraints of the dominion man-
date as explained in Section 3. In addition to the theologically-informed 
circumscriptions laid out above, the contextualist view of animal rights 
proposed by Palmer similarly constrains moral action towards other spe-
cies insofar as humans, for example, cannot wrongfully interfere with 
the interests of other creatures.59 While such a view could be extended 
to preclude human/nonhuman interaction altogether, in the absence of 
such additional arguments the position here defended can easily endorse 
human actions designed to support the interests of nonhuman creatures. 
Furthermore, on a view that strongly condemns human interference in 
nonhuman affairs, a key reason for precluding even humanitarian aid is 
the unavoidable lack of certainty regarding unintended consequences; 
presumably, such worries would be allayed by the otherwise-heavenly 
58My thanks to an anonymous reviewer for raising this issue.
59Palmer, “What (If Anything) Do We Owe to Wild Animals?,” 28. Elsewhere, Palmer 
explicitly positions her project as a development of Regan’s position; for more, see Palmer, 
Animal Ethics in Context, 38–39.
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conditions of the eschaton entailed by (1) without falling prey to paternal-
istic “zoo-ification” concerns about nonhuman autonomy.60
Particularly within the morally perfect state of heaven, it is feasible for 
cross-species relationships to further the welfare-interests of nonhuman 
creatures (even from within exceedingly thin relationships which respect 
the sovereignty of animals in the wild), so we cannot conclude that an 
infinitely good afterlife must preclude the fostering of such relationships. 
Importantly, this is true for each category outlined by the model: in differ-
ent ways, defined by the needs of the creatures in question, the Zoopolis 
model aims to preserve the interests of domesticated, wild, and liminal 
creatures qua each kind of creature—a fact made all the more salient by 
the notion that the violence and fear at the core of many cross-species 
relationships seems unlikely to obtain in heaven. This could be argued 
on theological grounds, with reference to the loving, and love-promoting, 
beatific vision, or philosophically, given that there would be no reason for 
species to fear each other in heaven.
However, some might argue that at least certain interspecies rela-
tionships necessarily include some level of enmity; Elizabeth Anderson, 
for example, has described that, for many non-domesticated creatures, 
humans are “in a permanent state of war with them, without possibility 
of negotiating for peace.”61 To Anderson, this state of perpetual conflict 
is rooted in two facts: “the essential opposition of their interests to ours 
and their incapacity for reciprocal accommodation with us.”62 The first of 
Anderson’s conditions is clearly not problematic for the paradisical state: 
whether via a hyper-literalized reading of Matthew 6:19–21 or as a cor-
ollary to passages like Revelation 21:4, such interspecies conflict appears 
to cease after death; this makes sense if the current “war” stems from 
resources which are finite on Earth, but will be unlimited in the escha-
ton.63 Anderson’s second condition seems met by the understanding that 
the Final State is comparable to the Primal State (as in the Garden); if this 
is so, then the fear divinely inserted into the human-animal relationship 
in Genesis 9:2 should likely be removed—in the heavenly absence of rea-
sons for animals to fear us (or, as Isaiah 11 depicts, for us to fear animals) 
60On this, see Panagiotarakou, “Right to Place,” 124.
61Anderson, “Animal Rights and the Value of Nonhuman Life,” 288. In this specific case, 
Anderson was discussing a variety of liminal creatures, but I take it that roughly identical 
arguments could be made for the relevant interests of wild creatures.
62Anderson, “Animal Rights and the Value of Nonhuman Life,” 289.
63On the different problem of predation in the eschaton, Clough argues that all creatures 
will be substantially changed in the eschaton such that predation is “no longer a possibil-
ity”; see On Animals, 158–162. Against this, Southgate advances an intentionally mysterious 
model of heaven that “preserves the characteristics of species, but without pain or death or 
destruction,” wherein predators are able to somehow remain predatory; see The Groaning of 
Creation, 85–90. Either way, the moral questions pertinent to such interspecies relationships 
are orthogonal to those raised by the Zoopolis model which focuses specifically on human 
interactions with nonhuman creatures.
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then there would be no reason why healthy, positive relationships could 
not develop.
A rejection of (1), then, might require one to assert that specifically 
dependent animals are nevertheless wronged qua their status as depend-
ent creatures. But, as discussed in Section 1, there is no good reason to 
think that dependent agents are any less politically empowered or more 
morally disadvantaged than independent agents.
Furthermore, the conditions which precipitate dependent agency—
namely, the fostering of loving, trusting, attentive relationships—are not 
only good, but often significantly ground our personalities and charac-
ter insofar as, in the words of Kevin Timpe, they become “folded into 
[the] self-understanding and identities” of people who cultivate such 
experiences.64 While different (and differently-abled) body types possess 
“mere-differences,” this category is distinct from “bad-differences” that 
negatively affect a person’s welfare; following Timpe, the inherent goods 
of social practices undergirding dependent agency might be sufficient for 
their continuation in a heavenly state, even if such practices often manifest 
merely functionally in our premortem state to prevent mere-differences 
from becoming bad-differences.65 In a different manner, humanity’s social 
nature might itself qualify as what Timpe calls a potential antecedent good 
of “beatified disability” insofar as it is a “general feature of creation that 
make at least some kinds of disability possible”; that is to say, it might not 
be possible for human society to be genuinely realized—either in this life 
or the next—without simultaneously manifesting at least some depend-
ent agents.66 Altogether, both humans and nonhuman creatures can be 
dependent agents in different ways—there is no good reason to think that 
such beings will not be present in an infinitely good afterlife while remain-
ing the same beings they were before they died.67
In short, we have both theological reasons (based in a story of God’s 
creative intentions) and philosophical reasons (grounded in a recognition 
64Timpe, “Disabled Beatitude,” 247.
65Note that this position is in direct contrast with Swinburne’s notion that God could 
allow the suffering of one person instrumentally for the good of some other person; on this, 
see Providence and the Problem of Evil, 235. My point is not only that the person does not suffer 
qua a dependent agent, but that the person, furthermore, experiences the goodness of the 
loving relationship which manifests their agency.
66Timpe, “Disabled Beatitude,” 254; as Timpe puts it “disability is an inherent part of 
actual human embodiment.”
67For more, see Timpe, “Defiant Afterlife,” and Yong, The Bible, Disability, and the Church. 
For a contrary position, which suggests that nonhuman animals might be “enhanced” in 
such a way as to make their cognitive function apparently similar to humans, thereby pre-
cipitating independent agency for postmortem humans, see Dougherty, The Problem of Animal 
Pain, 3. Dougherty thinks that this sort of cognitive enhancement naturally entails nonhuman 
animals gaining the ability to speak with humans; even if this is not the case, the presence 
of God and other spiritual beings could presumably serve as human-nonhuman translators, 
should the need arise. For a critique of heavenly cognitive enhancements for animals, see 
Hereth, “Two Arguments for Animal Immortality,” 188–190.
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of the potential goodness of cross-species relationships and the inherent 
goodness of dependent-agency-manifesting relationships) to affirm (1): 
SERVICE applies in the eschaton.
(2) The Zoopolis Model Explains How (1) Could Operate
To deny (2) is to argue that there is at least one good reason to think that 
the Zoopolis model could not promote SERVICE in the eschaton, perhaps 
by highlighting some distinction between premortem and postmortem 
existence that could establish how the model justifiably applies to only 
one state. Clearly, Donaldson and Kymlicka’s motivations for outlining 
the model in the first place are not eschatologically oriented; they explain 
in the first paragraph of the book that their concern is to create “new pos-
sibilities, conceptually and politically, for overcoming current roadblocks 
to progressive change.”68 Nevertheless, if it can be demonstrated that the 
Zoopolis model not only applies to the non-ideal (or, in theological terms, 
“fallen”) earthly state, but to the idealized heavenly state as well, then 
theists who regularly pray for God’s will to be done “on Earth as it is in 
Heaven” will have even more reason to consider the progressive changes 
Donaldson and Kymlicka are concerned to promote.69
Briefly, Donaldson and Kymlicka identify nine rights and duties 
entailed by community membership which can be extended to counte-
nance equal consideration for domesticated animals (D):
D1. Basic socialization
D2. Mobility and the sharing of public space
D3. Duties of protection
D4. Use of animal products
D5. Use of animal labor
D6. Medical care
D7. Sex and reproduction
D8. Predation/diet
D9. Political representation70
Each of these elements either fits well with the peaceful picture of the 
New Heavens and New Earth for both humans and animals or for neither 
humans nor animals. For example, (D3) and (D6) are ruled out for both 
humans and nonhuman animals in the next world, for if there is truly 
“neither death, nor mourning, nor crying, nor pain” (Revelation 21:4) then 
68Donaldson and Kymlicka, Zoopolis, 1, emphasis added.
69This is the essence of Linzey’s overall theological project: to defend the care of animals 
now on the basis of God’s original intention and ultimate plan.
70Donaldson and Kymlicka, Zoopolis, 123.
493IS HEAVEN A ZOOPOLIS?
concerns about protection from harm or the provision of medical care 
become likewise absent.
On the other hand, (D1) and (D2) entail “learning how to live with 
the animals in our midst” in an uncoercive manner and promoting the 
positive right of mobility (beyond the negative right of “freedom from 
restraint”); as described previously, removal of the fear which function-
ally divides many humans and animals—and the fostering of interspecies 
agential relationships—could easily accommodate the desires inherent to 
Donaldson and Kymlicka’s first two areas.71 Notably, (D4) and (D5) are not 
absolute prohibitions on the use of animal products or labor, but simply 
restrictions that we might use such means only “under conditions that 
are consistent with their agency and their membership status” within the 
community.72 Because an egalitarian picture of heaven, wherein all mem-
bers experience full equality before God, could easily accommodate a 
variety of potential exchange systems free of exploitation, this element 
could easily obtain in the relevant way.73
While (D7) and (D8) raise interesting questions about the nature of 
embodiment in the eschaton, there is no good reason to differentiate 
between humans and nonhuman animals in this regard either: whatever 
sort of sexual relationships and dietary habits (including a potential 
complete lack of both) are enjoyed by humans in heaven could also be 
enjoyed by animals. Finally, (D9) is also equally applicable to humans 
and animals: on the specifically Christian belief that Jesus is the leader of 
all Creation for “all things have been created through Him and for Him. 
He is before all things, and in Him all things hold together” (Colossians 
1:15–20)—that is to say, given that Jesus is Christ—then no matter what 
the political community amounts to in heaven, it is commanded by the 
Lord of both humans and animals. In other words, the biblical refrain 
that one day “every knee shall bow and every tongue confess” (Rom. 
14:11, Phil. 2:10) is best understood as a cross-species prophecy.74 
71Importantly, this is not to say that individuals carry a responsibility for building rela-
tionships with each other; just as, presumably, humans will not be obligated to be close 
friends with every other individual in Paradise, particular humans will carry no obligation 
to form relationships with particular animals. The constraint here is on a structural, not per-
sonal, level. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for raising this concern. See also n. 26.
72Donaldson and Kymlicka, Zoopolis, 135.
73Although space constraints prevent a full development of my thinking on this point 
here, I’m inclined to follow Elizabeth Anderson’s critique of luck egalitarianism as especially 
relevant to considerations of the afterlife; relational equality is the relevant paradigm for any 
ethical political framework and could rightly be expected to obtain in heaven—if this is true, 
then even capitalistic exchange between morally perfected creatures may be possible, since 
the social structures between them would likewise be perfected (though I admit I have, at this 
point, simply posited, rather than defended, this suggestion). For more on luck-vs-relational 
egalitarianism, see Anderson, “The Fundamental Disagreement between Luck Egalitarians 
and Relational Egalitarians” and “What is the Point of Equality?” For more on heaven as a 
state of perfect equality, see Blomberg, “Degrees of Reward in the Kingdom of Heaven?”
74On this, again, see Pawl, “Exploring Theological Zoology.”
494 Faith and Philosophy
Regarding wild animals (W), the Zoopolis model argues for two main 
duties for humans:
W1. Respect for sovereign territory
W2. Non-exploitative cooperation as needed75
As discussed previously, particularly within both the constraints of the 
dominion mandate (properly construed) and the loving presence of the 
beatific vision, there is little reason to worry that both (W1) and (W2) 
could be honored in the afterlife.
Finally, Donaldson and Kymlicka point out that the rights and respon-
sibilities relevant to denizenship are, by nature, difficult to concretely 
define (since most such conversations are concerned with either full 
citizens or full non-citizens), but a variety of good reasons often lead 
humans to nevertheless negotiate politically-liminal relationships.76 In 
roughly the same way, the difficulties of drafting a model for liminal 
animal (L) denizenship for those creatures who span the domesticated/
wild boundary is tricky, but three basic areas of concern (with associ-
ated duties for humans to respect) can be highlighted within the Zoopolis 
model that respectfully treats liminal animals as the distinct kinds of 
creatures that they are:
L1. Security of residency
L2. Reciprocity of denizenship
L3. Anti-stigma safeguards77
As with the cases of domesticated and wild creatures, many of the reasons 
why humans and animals conflict over earthly space seem unlikely to be 
problematic in a heavenly space, making (L1) a non-issue for the present 
argument. The concern for respect at the core of both (L2) and (L3) is sim-
ilarly easily accommodated within the loving context of beatified space; at 
its core, a heavenly theory of denizenship would simply allow creatures to 
be what they are, promoting interspecies relationships insofar as they do 
not interfere with these other concerns.
Notably, the larger number of obligations on human relationships with 
domesticated animals does not entail an axiological claim about the value 
of such creatures; it is simply a recognition of the thicker duties that come 
naturally from living in community together and relying on each other. 
Altogether, each of (D1)–(D9), (W1)–(W2), and (L1)–(L3) are fully compat-
ible with standard pictures of embodied eschatology, particularly from a 
Christian perspective. That is to say, the critique of (2) here considered is 
undercut.
75Donaldson and Kymlicka, Zoopolis, 205–209.
76Donaldson and Kymlicka, Zoopolis, 239.
77Donaldson and Kymlicka, Zoopolis, 239–240.
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5. Heaven Is a Zoopolis
Finally, consider the picture of the Final State often derived from Christian 
scripture which sees humans and animals living together in harmonious 
community within the ever-present love of God. The Bible is clear that 
God cares for animals (Psalms 50:10–11), interacts with animals (Job 12:7–
10), and receives worship from animals (Psalms 148; Revelation 5:13), not 
only in this life, but in the next (Isaiah 65:17–25). Just as God declared 
the Edenic paradise filled with animals to be “good” in the first pages of 
Genesis, so too does God declare in Revelation 21:5 “Behold, I am making 
all things new!”—a line which has led centuries of interpreters to see the 
Final State as a restored recapitulation of the Primal State. Edward Quinn 
has pointed out that it is impossible to understand the continuity between 
the Old and the New Creation unless the animal inhabitants of the former 
continue into the latter;78 a point echoed by John Wesley in his sermon 
“The General Deliverance,” which contains the following passage worth 
quoting at length:
The whole brute creation will then, undoubtedly, be restored, not only to 
the vigour, strength, and swiftness which they had at their creation, but to a 
far higher degree of each than they ever enjoyed. They will be restored, not 
only to that measure of understanding which they had in paradise, but to a 
degree of it as much higher than that, as the understanding of an elephant 
is beyond that of a worm. And whatever affections they had in the garden 
of God, will be restored with vast increase; being exalted and refined in a 
manner which we ourselves are not now able to comprehend.79
If humans are likewise present in the New Heavens and New Earth then, 
just as in the beginning, it is reasonable to expect that humans and ani-
mals interact.80 The arguments provided here suggest that Zoopolis offers 
a promising avenue for conceptualizing how that interaction might look.
Donaldson and Kymlicka suggest that a taste of the zoopolis might now 
be found in the example of the animal sanctuary;81 for theists, the escha-
tological vision of interspecies harmony found in the Biblical depiction 
of the New Heavens and New Earth offers a similar, undoubtedly more 
preferable, study. To return to where this paper began, in both the ani-
mal sanctuary and the heavenly zoopolis, the concern to best accomplish 
CARE is predicated on a functional appreciation of IMAGE as described 
jointly in SERVICE. Also, in both cases, humans and nonhuman animals 
mutually benefit from the development of interspecies relationships, best 
exemplifying the sort of trust and love that grounds our most utopic con-
ceptions of political life. If this is indeed what heaven looks like, then 
78Quinn, “Animals in Heaven?,” 224.
79Wesley, “Sermon 60.”
80Notably, Genesis 2:19 presents animal-human interaction as not only the immediate 
consequence of, but a key justification for, the creation of animals.
81Donaldson and Kymlicka, Zoopolis, 121.
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theists—particularly theists who pray for God’s will to be done “on Earth 
as it is in Heaven”—should strongly consider what moves we can make as 
servants in this world that will best represent all of our lives in the next.82
The University of Arkansas
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